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Using the method of Haberis and Lipińska (2020), this paper explores the effect of
forward guidance (FG) in a two-country New Keynesian (NK) economy under the zero
lower bound (ZLB). We simulate the effect of different length of FG or the zero interest
rate policy under the circumstance of the global liquidity trap. We show that the size of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution plays an important role in determining the beggar-
thy-neighbor effect or the prosper-thy-neighbor effect of home FG policy on the foreign
economy. And in the former case, by targeting a minimum welfare loss of the individual
country alone but not global welfare loss, two central banks can perform interesting FG
bargaining in which they cooperatively adopt the same length of FG or strategically deviate
from cooperation.
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1 Introduction
Since the late 1990s, central banks in advanced economies have conducted monetary policy
based on the presumption that they would face the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest
rates due to the observed disinflation and slowdown in productivity. In fact, since the global
financial crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the European sovereign
debt crisis in 2010, central banks have been implementing so-called unconventional monetary
policies such as the zero interest rate policy (ZIP) and quantitative easing (QE) and have
experienced the ZLB during this period. In the course of experiencing the ZLB for more than
a decade, central banks have been considering when and how to exit the ZLB, as well as how
long unconventional monetary policy should be continued for economic recovery. Recently, in
order to properly understand and implement unconventional monetary policy, policymakers
and central bankers have been focusing on forward guidance (FG) as a new monetary policy
instrument. Moreover, due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the Fed announced that it will
maintain the ZLB until 2023. As described, the study of FG policy is a serious issue of how to
stimulate and recover the economy under the ZLB constraint.
This paper examines whether and to what extent FG policy is affected in a two-country
New Keynesian (NK) model when both countries have different length of FG and ZIP policies
in the context of a global liquidity trap. There is a growing body of literature that discusses
the mechanism and effectiveness of FG in NK models in closed economies. On the other hand,
there seems to be a limited number of papers that discuss how FG in one country spills over to
other countries and how the international transmission mechanism of monetary policy through
exchange rate changes works (Haberis and Lipińska, 2020; Jones, Kulish and Rees, 2018). In
this paper, we use the NK model, which assumes two countries of roughly equal economic size,
to analyze the international spillover effects of the adoption of FG policies when both countries
face a zero interest rate constraint from the perspective of welfare comparison. The model
used in this paper is the standard two-country NK model by Clarida, Galı and Gertler (2002),
and we assume that the two countries face zero interest rate constraints simultaneously. As
a numerical method, we adopt the Occasionally Binding constraint tool (OccBin) developed
by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), following the FG study by Haberis and Lipińska (2020).
Thus, we will examine the international spillovers and welfare losses of FGs by using the latest
numerical methods for the standard two-country NK model.　
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The contribution of this paper is to show the following new points in the literature dealing
with ZLB and FG so far. First, in a two-country situation where two countries face a ZLB
at the same time, we evaluate the policy in two cases: a) when both central banks adopt FG
policy at the same time, and b) when the central bank of either country adopts FG policy.
Next, we examine how the extension of the duration of FG policy in each country affects
output, inflation, and nominal interest rates in the two countries through the international
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. At this time, there will be bargaining between
the central banks of the two countries as they seek to maximize their own welfare. We will
examine what kind of bargaining might be envisioned. Again, the above discussion will add a
new perspective to the growing body of FG literature.
The findings of this paper are as follows. First, the magnitude of the risk aversion coefficient
of household consumption (CRRA) plays an important role in determining the beggar-thy-
neighbor and prosper-thy-neighbor effects in foreign economies. In other words, in the case
where households behave in a risk-averse manner (CRRA > 1), home FG has negative economic
effects on the foreign country with symmetric economic structure. On the other hand, if
households are risk averse, home FG has the opposite economic effect on the counterpart
country. Second, if households are risk-averse, both countries would be better off adopting FG
policies if the central bank’s objective is to minimize individual country welfare losses rather
than to minimize global welfare losses. Furthermore, if the home country extends the duration
of FG over its counterpart, there will be a duration of FG that minimizes the welfare loss of
the home country. Third, we point out the possibility of interesting FG bargaining in which
either the central banks of the two countries adopt the same number of quarters of FG in a
coordinated manner or, conversely, one of the central banks deviates from policy coordination.
In sum, our study underscores the interesting result that bargaining about FG duration between
two countries of roughly equal economic size is not a straightforward process.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature related to this
study, and Section 3 describes the two-country NK model. Section 4 describes the simulation
method and calibration values of the occasional constraint used in this paper. Section 5 reports
the main findings of this paper. We discuss the interaction of both FG and ZLB policies in a




In this section, we briefly review the previous literature on the effects of FG in terms of the
NK model and classify the contributions of this paper to previous studies. In particular, this
paper is deeply related to the works of Fujiwara, Nakajima, Sudo and Teranishi (2013), Gaĺı
(2020), and Haberis and Lipińska (2020) on the effect of FG in the NK model.
The effectiveness of forward guidance
In recent years, the ZLB has been a serious problem in advanced economies such as the United
States, the Eurozone, and Japan. As mentioned earlier, once faced with the ZLB, central banks
are unable to manipulate short-term nominal interest rates as a policy instrument.1 Within
this framework, there have been a number of studies dealing with the expectations channel of
monetary policy by managing private sector expectations. In particular, the effectiveness of this
expectations channel is strongly supported by theoretical studies based on the NK model. For
example, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Jung, Teranishi and Watanabe (2005) argue
that central banks can exert the effects of monetary policy even when they are faced with
liquidity traps. According to their study, even in the case of a liquidity trap caused by a
negative natural rate of interest, the central bank can manipulate private sector expectations
through its commitment to keep zero interest rates for some time. According to Adam and
Billi (2006) and Adam and Billi (2007), the cost of implementing discretionary policy is greater
under the ZLB than under a model without the ZLB.2
Forward guidance in an open economy model
The effect of FG policy in an open economy has been examined in several studies. Gaĺı (2020)
showed that the difference between home and foreign interest rates captures the effect of FG
policy in a small open economy model. He points out that the exchange rate dynamics are
inconsistent with the interest rate parity hypothesis. He refers to this inconsistency as the
1See Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), English, López-Salido and Tetlow (2013), and Williamson et al. (2015)
for a detailed discussion of unconventional monetary policy.
2Hirose, Iiboshi, Shintani and Ueda (2021) examine the effect of FG of behavioral NK model for the US
economy, whereas Iiboshi, Shintani and Ueda (forthcoming) estimate the impact of FG policy for Japan’s
economy.
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forward guidance exchange rate puzzle. Haberis and Lipińska (2020) also examine the interna-
tional transmission mechanism of FG policy in a small open economy model. According to their
analysis, foreign FG policies are effective if they improve social welfare in the home country.
Jones et al. (2018) estimated the international spillover effects of FG policies in a two-country
NK model. They showed that when a monetary easing FG shock occurs in the U.S. economy,
the shock has a beggar-thy-neighbor effect on the Canadian economy. Thus, when a monetary
easing FG shock occurs in the U.S., the output of the Canadian economy will be significantly
reduced.　
As mentioned earlier, central banks in advanced economies faced the ZLB after the 2008
global financial crisis and should have considered such a financial crisis as the cause of the
negative global demand shock. Therefore, several papers have extended the issue of ZLBs in
open economies (Cook and Devereux, 2011; Fujiwara et al., 2013; Ida, 2013, 2018; Nakajima,
2008). Fujiwara et al. (2013) examined the optimal commitment policy in a two-country NK
model where the home country and the foreign country face a ZLB. Their analysis shows that
when negative natural interest rate shocks in each country return to a steady state, the optimal
commitment policy of each country becomes more complex than in a closed economy model.
They also show the effectiveness of price level targeting in a two-country NK model where two
countries face a ZLB.
Comparison between previous studies and this study
The contributions of this paper can be compared with four previous works in the literature.
First, Gaĺı (2020) examines the effects of FG policies in a small open NK model, whereas we
examine the effects of FG policies in a two-country open NK model. Second, Haberis and
Lipińska (2020) examine the impact of large foreign FG policies on a small home country. In
their analysis, the large country’s central bank follows the monetary policy rules imposed by
the FG, while the small country’s central bank is able to implement its optimal commitment
policy. In contrast, our analysis assumes that both the home and foreign central banks of large
countries implement monetary policy according to the Taylor rule with the FG under the ZLB
and bargain with each other regarding policies. In this sense, this study focuses on the practical
aspects of monetary policy rather than examining the optimal monetary policy. Third, while
Haberis and Lipińska (2020) consider that negative shocks to natural rate of interest occur
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only in foreign countries, our study mainly considers the case of a global liquidity trap where
the natural rates of interest decline simultaneously in the home country and foreign country.
Finally, our paper is also close to that of Fujiwara et al. (2013), who examine the interaction
of ZLB policies between the central banks in a two-country NK model with a global liquidity
trap in terms of optimal commitment policy. In contrast to their work, this paper focuses on
the case where the central banks of both countries adopt the FG and ZLB policies to follow
monetary policy rules in a two-country NK model with a global liquidity trap.
3 A two-country new Keynesian model
In this paper, we derive a two-country NK model based on the framework of Clarida et al.
(2002).3 Consider an economy with two large symmetric countries: home and foreign. The
population sizes of the home and foreign countries are 1− γ and γ, respectively. There are two
production sectors in each country: the final goods sector, which is characterized by perfect
competition, and the intermediate goods sector, where firms face monopolistic competition and
nominal price rigidities (Calvo, 1983). We allow the degree of price stickiness to vary across
countries.
Assume that there is a complete market in both countries and that only final goods are
traded. The number of producers of final goods is equal to the number of households in each
country. The model also assumes that purchasing power parity is maintained according to
Clarida et al. (2002). Thus, we consider the case of producer currency pricing.
Finally, unless otherwise noted, the same equation holds for foreign countries. Also note
that variables for foreign countries are represented by asterisks.
3.1 Log-linearized two-country NK model
In this paper, we provide a log-linearized system of structural equations.4 The structural equa-
tions derived in the previous section are log-linearized around the steady state. Here, lowercase
3This paper considers a two-country model in which the consumption basket consists of Cobb-Douglus ag-
gregates. Pappa (2004) considers the costs without policy coordination in a two-country NK model where the
consumption basket consists of CES aggregates
4The online Appendix provides a detailed derivation of the structural model. See also Clarida et al. (2002)
and Walsh (2017).
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variables are used to represent the logarithmic deviation from the steady state. Specifically, the
log-linearized variables around the steady state are represented by ht = log(Ht/H̄), where H̄
represents the steady state value. The log-linearized structural equations can be summarized
as follows:
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ1xt + κ2x
∗












xt = Etxt+1 + ϑEt∆x
∗
t+1 − (σ0)















rt ≥ 0, (5)
r∗t ≥ 0. (6)
Here, variables with an asterisk represent foreign ones. πt is the home country inflation, π
∗
t is
the foreign country inflation, xt is the home country output gap, and x
∗
t is the foreign country
output gap. rt is the home country nominal interest rate and r
∗
t is the foreign country interest
rate. ut and u
∗
t are home and foreign cost-push shocks, respectively. r
n
t is the home country
natural interest rate and (rnt )
∗ represents the foreign natural interest rate. The shock to natural
rate of interest in each country follows an AR(1) process.











(σ + η − (1− γ)(σ − 1)), κ∗2 =
(1− α∗)(1− α∗β)
α∗
(1− γ)(σ − 1),
ϑ =
γ(σ − 1)
σ − γ(σ − 1)
, ϑ∗ =
(1− γ)(σ − 1)
σ − (1− γ)(σ − 1)
, σ0 = σ − γ(σ − 1), σ
∗
0 = σ − (1− γ)(σ − 1).
Equations (1) and (2) represent open economy NKPCs and show that the home country NKPC
depends on the foreign output gap through both risk sharing and terms of trade channels.
A similar mechanism can be seen in Equation (2). The coefficient γ(σ − 1) represents this
mechanism.5 Equations (3) and (4) represent the open economy dynamic IS (DIS) curve. As in
the case of NKPC, the home country DIS depends on the first difference in the foreign expected
output gap through both the risk-sharing channel and the terms-of-trade channel. Finally, (5)
and (6) represent the ZLB constraints on nominal interest rates for each country.
5See Clarida et al. (2002) for a detailed discussion of these channels.
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When the intertemporal substitution of consumption becomes unity, as in Clarida et al.
(2002), the international dependence between home and foreign countries disappears. Thus,
when σ = 1, the two-country NK model becomes a closed one.
3.2 Monetary policy rules and welfare criteria
Here, we derive a second-order approximation of the household utility function weighted by the
degree of openness. The welfare criterion is used to evaluate the performance of FG policies
in each country. The derivation of the central bank’s loss function is carried out in the case of
policy coordination. The following derivation is based on Clarida et al. (2002).
The utility function of the planner is given by





















To obtain the well-defined loss function, we need to eliminate distortions created by monop-
olistic competition and real money balances. The first distortion is eliminated by an optimal
subsidy rate that eliminates price markup created by monopolistic competition in each country.
Fiscal authorities choose an optimal subsidy rate that restores the natural level of output to the
efficient level of one in a zero-inflation steady state. As noted earlier, such an optimal subsidy
is given as follows:
(1− τ)µ = 1, (1− τ∗)µ∗ = 1,
where τ denotes an optimal subsidy rate and µ denotes the steady-state mark-up. Accordingly,
as shown in Clarida et al. (2002), the optimal subsidy rate leads to the efficient steady state in
terms of the distortion caused by monopolistic competition.
However, we also consider the second distortion, which is a result of an opportunity cost
of holding money. As shown in Woodford (2003), this opportunity cost should be considerably
smaller in steady state to obtain a well-defined loss function of the central bank. In particular,
Woodford (2003) argues that real money balances are sufficiently close to being satiated in the
optimal steady state. To obtain the loss function, we can eliminate the distortion produced by
the opportunity cost of money.6
6See Chapter 6 in Woodford (2003) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
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Under these assumptions, we derive the central bank’s loss function by implementing the










Here t.i.p represents the terms that are independent of monetary policy and O(||ξ||3) includes
the higher order terms for the Taylor approximation. For any period t, the central bank’s loss
function under policy coordination (Lt) is given as follows:
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Equation (10) consists of three objectives. The first term of the right-hand side denotes the
stabilization of home inflation. The second term of the right-hand side represents the stabiliza-
tion of the output gap. Finally, due to the presence of real money balances, the interest rate
stabilization is captured by the third term of the right-hand side. The corresponding objectives
hold for the foreign central bank’s loss function. In Equation (9), the presence of the third-
term of the right-hand side is associated with the international spillover effect through both
risk-sharing and the terms of trade channels. Because this term disappears when σ = 1, the
above loss function simply becomes a weighted average of the home and foreign loss functions
like a closed economy model.
7The online Appendix provides a detailed derivation of the central bank’s loss function. See also Clarida
et al. (2002).
8
3.3 Monetary policy rules, specification of FG and structural shocks
Monetary policy rules
We specify monetary policy rules. In contrast to Fujiwara et al. (2013) and Haberis and Lipińska
(2020), we consider that central banks follow a simple instrument rule instead of implementing
a targeting rule derived from optimal monetary policy. Following Taylor (1993), we assume
that both home and foreign central banks adopt the following simple monetary policy rule with
the ZLB constraints on nominal interest rates:
rt = max{0, (1− ψr)(ψππt + ψxxt) + ψrrt−1 + et}, (12)

















Here, ψπ denotes the inflation stabilization in the Taylor rule, ψx denotes the output gap
stabilization in the rule, and ψr is the term for interest rate smoothing. et represents an
exogenous monetary policy shock. It follows from Equation (13) that the foreign monetary
policy rule follows the same specification as the home monetary policy rule.
Specification of FG policies
Let us explain how FG is specified in this paper. Following Haberis and Lipińska (2020), the FG
policies adopted by both countries is referred to as a calendar-based FG. This FG specification
implies that the central bank commits to a ZIP for longer than the ZLB periods suggested by
the standard Taylor rule. In this paper, we regard the terminology of FG policy adopted in
Haberis and Lipińska (2020) as the terminology of fixed length FG suggested by Eggertsson,
Egiev, Lin, Platzer and Riva (2020). Following Haberis and Lipińska (2020), we label several
specifications of FG policies. More specifically, in our simulation, we focus on four types of
FG policies: with two extra quarters, four extra quarters, five extra quarters, and ten extra
quarters. In addition, we consider the following four policy options for the foreign central
bank. First, the foreign central bank can conduct its monetary policy in an economy without
the ZLB. Second, similarly to the home country, the foreign country also faces the ZLB. Third,
the foreign central bank adopts the same length of FG policy as is employed by the home
central bank. Fourth, while the home central bank can choose from four types of FG policies,
the foreign central bank fixes the number of quarters of the FG policy at five.
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As mentioned earlier, Haberis and Lipińska (2020) explored the international FG spillover
effect of how a large country’s FG policy affects an optimal commitment policy adopted by a
small country. In contrast to their study, we consider that a global liquidity trap shock matters
when both countries are large. This is because a negative shock of natural rate of interest in
one country causes an adverse effect on the other country. Therefore, even the Taylor rule can
induce the adverse effect of a negative natural interest rate in one country on the other country.
Accordingly, we consider a global liquidity trap shock that simultaneously creates a negative
impact on the natural rate of interests in both countries. We postulate that this shock makes
the natural interest rate in each country undergo a decline of the same size.
Structural shocks
The structural shocks considered in this paper are two shocks: a shock to natural rate of
interest that occur in only the home country, and a global liquidity trap shock in both the
home country and foreign countries. Although the latter shock is characterized by the former
shocks, the latter feature is set to occur simultaneously in both countries. These two shocks













∗ + (eGLt )
∗,
where ρr is the coefficient of AR processes, e
NR
t is the independent shock to the natural rate
of interest generated in the home country, and eGLt and(e
GL
t )
∗ are the independent shocks to
the global liquidity traps in the home and foreign countries, respectively.
4 Solution methods
4.1 Parameterizations
This section summarizes the calibrated values used in this study. The calibrated value of
structural parameters are summarized in Table 1. We set the Calvo lottery to 0.9.8 The
8This value seems to be slightly higher value compared to previous studies. We confirmed that the main
results quantitatively and qualitatively remains unaffected any change of this parameter.
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discount factor is set to 0.985. The degree of openness is set to 0.5. Thus, we consider the case
where the country size of the home country is equal to that of the foreign country.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
We set the relative risk aversion coefficient for consumption to 2.0 as a benchmark calibra-
tion. The selection of this value is based on the calibrated value in Pappa (2004). This value
is crucial in a two-country NK model. Clarida et al. (2002) showed that when this value is less
than unity, the international risk-sharing effect works negatively. Thus, if this value takes unity,
the model corresponds to the closed economy one because the open economy effect vanishes. In
particular, Fujiwara et al. (2013) and Nakajima (2008) addressed the role of this parameter in
a two-country NK model with the ZLB. Naturally, even in the case for simple monetary policy
rules, the effect of FG policies in a two-country economy is affected by the value of the risk
aversion coefficient. We select several values of this parameter in the robustness check.
Finally, we select the parameters for monetary policy rules and the natural rate of interest.
We assume that the parameterization for the monetary policy rule is common to both countries.
Inflation stabilization ψπ is set to 1.25 and the output gap stabilization is set to 0.5. We set
the term for interest rate smoothing to 0. If we take interest rate smoothing into account, we
conjecture that the reaction of the interest rate gradually changes even when an FG policy
terminates. The AR (1) coefficient for the natural interest rate for each country is set to 0.8
with a variance of 1.0.
4.2 Numerical approach
In this paper, we follow Haberis and Lipińska (2020) and use a piecewise linear perfect-foresight
algorithm by adopting the OccBin toolkit using the Dynare platform, which is a toolkit de-
veloped by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) to solve equilibrium under the occasionally binding
constraint. Let us give a brief summary of the numerical method for the occasionally binding
model used to solve the model equilibrium under the ZIP.
This type of method can be roughly divided into two categories as follows. The first is
called the global method, which has extremely high computational accuracy but is extremely
computationally demanding and unsuitable for large models. The second is the extended
perfect-foresight path (EPFP) by Ray and Taylor (1983). The advantage of the EPFP is that
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it simplifies the method of calculating the expected value, so it can be applied to medium or
large-scale models even on an ordinary personal computer.
OccBin belongs to the second category, EPFP. Atkinson, Richter and Throckmorton (2019)
used a Monte Carlo method to compare the numerical results of the global method and EPFP.
Atkinson et al. (2019) compared the numerical results of the global method and EPFP using
the Monte Carlo method, and reported that the difference between the two methods was not
significant, although the results of the former were higher. Therefore, if our research follows
this latest research report, the numerical results of this paper will be justified even if the global
method is not used.
5 Quantitative results
This section provides the main results of the paper. We investigate the effect of FG policies on
the international spillover mechanism of monetary policy under a global liquidity trap shock.
Section 5.1 examines the effect of a home FG on a two-country economy when the ZLB is
binding in the home country, which faces a negative shock to natural rate of interest. Section
5.2 reports the impulse response analysis under a negative global liquidity trap shock. We
focus on how several specifications of home FG policies affect the international transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. Section 5.3 reports the welfare losses in terms of the degree of
FG policies of both countries. We calculate the time series transition of welfare losses in terms
of home, foreign and global losses.
5.1 FG policy under a liquidity trap in the home country
We focus on how a negative shock to natural rate of interest changes the impact on the home
country and how it affects foreign macroeconomic variables through international spillovers.
The international spillover effect is captured by σ, γ, κ1, κ2, and ϑ as well as the counterparts
in the foreign country. In particular, the sign of ϑ is the threshold for the existence of open
economy effects: it is non-negative when σ > 1, and negative when σ < 1.　
As pointed out by Clarida et al. (2002) and Fujiwara et al. (2013), the parameter σ plays an
important role in the two-country NK model when international spillover effects are considered.
On the other hand, the above structural parameters are unaffected by changes in the parameter
γ. Therefore, before going to analysis of a global liquidity trap, we consider different cases based
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on attitudes toward risk: avoidance, neutrality, and affection, corresponding to σ being one of
the three values 2.0, 1.0, and 0.5, and show the contrasting effect of home country FG policies
on the two-country NK model by.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the impulse response to a negative shock to natural rate of
interest occurring in the home country for σ = 2. The solid line shows the impulse response
to a negative shock to natural rate of interest occurring in the home country. The solid line
shows the impulse response in the case of a two extra quarters FG policy and the dashed line
shows the impulse response in the case of a five extra quarters FG policy. The dashed line also
shows the case of the nine extra quarters FG policy. Finally, the dotted line shows the impulse
response when the ZLB is not introduced. The left side of the figure shows the impulse response
of the home country and the right side shows the impulse response of the foreign country. The
lower left part of the graph shows that the natural rate of interest is declining in the home
country.
[Insert Figure 1 (a)-(c) around here]
According to this figure, after a liquidity trap shock in the home country, a stronger FG
policy implies that a more extended ZIP is adopted. In particular, a nine-extra-quarter FG
policy strongly raises both inflation and the output gap. Thus, a home country central bank
that adopts a strong FG policy strongly stimulates inflation and the output gap. On the other
hand, the response of foreign macroeconomic variables does not seem to be affected by the
decline in the home country’s natural interest rate shock.
Table 2(a) reports the welfare losses for each country in this scenario. The numbers with
a star indicate that the welfare loss is minimized in this simulation. From this table, we can
see that the welfare loss in the foreign country is minimized when the welfare loss in the home
country is minimized. As long as the negative natural interest rate occurs only in the home
country, the extended FG policy adopted by the home central bank can improve social welfare
in both countries. Thus, in the case of a shock to natural rate of interest in the home country,
the home country’s enhanced FG policy will not be inconsistent with foreign monetary policy.
[Insert Table 2 (a)-(d) around here]
Figure 1(b) shows the case where σ = 1. It immediately turns out that ϑ and κ2 (and
the foreign counterparts) are zero when σ = 1. When σ = 1, the response on the left side of
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this graph is the same as that obtained in Figure 1(a). On the other hand, macroeconomic
variables in the foreign economy do not respond to shocks to natural rate of interest in their
home country, simply because there are no international spillover effects. Therefore, the welfare
loss is naturally null in the foreign country, as shown in Table 2(b). This result is consistent
with that of Fujiwara et al. (2013), who examined the impact of a global liquidity trap shock in
a two-country NK model in which the home and foreign central banks cooperate to implement
an optimal commitment policy.
Figure 1(c) plots the impulse responses for the case of σ = 0.5. As mentioned earlier, the
structural parameters captured by the international spillover effect are negative values. The
results show that the response of the home country is symmetric to the case of Figure 1(a)
and (b). However, a decrease in the home country’s natural interest rate leads to a decrease in
both the foreign interest rate and the output gap.
Summing up, we would like to stress the case for σ = 2.0. On the one hand, in the case of
σ = 0.5, the responses of foreign macroeconomic variables are symmetric to those of the home
country in which the shock to natural rate of interest occurs. On the other hand, in the case
of σ = 2.0, the responses of foreign macroeconomic variables are asymmetric to those in the
home country.
5.2 The interaction of FG under a global liquidity trap
In this and the following sections, we focus on the world economy under a positive international
risk sharing channel, say σ = 2.0. And we examine the impulse response to a global liquidity
trap shock that simultaneously induces a negative shock to natural rate of interest in both
countries. We classify the impulse response to a global liquidity trap shock in accordance with
several specifications of foreign monetary policy. These exercises are described by four cases
shown in Figure 2 (a) to (d).
First, Figure 2 (a) illustrates the impulse response to a global liquidity trap shock in the case
where the foreign central bank conducts its monetary policy without the ZLB. The left-hand
side of the figure shows the response of the home country, whereas the right-hand side of the
figure corresponds to that of the foreign country. The first, second, and third rows of the figure
represent the response of inflation, the output gap, and the nominal interest rate, respectively.
It follows from this figure that the extended announcement of the home FG policy prolongs
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the termination date of a zero interest rate policy. Since the ZLB is not binding in the foreign
country, the foreign nominal interest rate seems to be unaffected by changes of the home FG
policy. In addition, both inflation and the output gap in the foreign country remains unaffected
by the extension of the home FG policy. On the contrary, the figure shows that home ten extra
quarters FG policy creates a boom in both inflation and the output gap in its country. As
shown in Table 2, however, the effect of the extended FG policy in the home country might
not be desirable in terms of worldwide social welfare. Indeed, Table 3 (a) indicates that the
extension of FG in the home country worsens social welfare in the foreign country.
[Insert Figure 2 (a)-(d) around here]
Second, Figure 2 (b) portrays the impulse response when the ZLB is binding in the foreign
country. The home central bank extends a ZIP in accordance with the prolonged home FG
policy, whereas the foreign policy rate faces the ZLB. However, the number of quarters during
which the foreign policy rate faces the ZLB is much less than in the home country. In addition,
when the foreign central bank terminates the ZIP, the foreign policy rate is characterized by
an inertial manner in response to changes of the home FG policy. Concretely, the foreign
policy rate gradually increases as the home FG policy is extended in the case where the foreign
central bank decides to terminate the ZIP. Regardless of this reaction of the foreign policy rate,
inflation and the output gap remain unchanged by changes of the home FG policy.
[Insert Table 3 (a)-(d) around here]
On the other hand, as shown in Figure 2 (a), the home central bank that extends the ZIP
for nine extra quarters can create a boom in both inflation and the output gap in its country.
Figure 2 (a) and (b) indicates that the adoption of the home FG policy deteriorates the welfare
loss of the foreign country, whereas it enhances the social welfare of the home country. This
result contrasts starkly with the result of Haberis and Lipińska (2020). More precisely, in their
study, the adoption of the FG policy in the large country can counteract welfare losses of the
home country as long as the large country can enhance social welfare in its country. In other
words, the adoption of the FG policy in the large country causes the prosper-thy-neighbor effect
on the home country in their study. On the other hand, we demonstrate that when the size of
the home country is equal to that of the foreign country (γ = 0.5), the extension of the home
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FG policy produces the beggar-thy-neighbor effect on the foreign country. This observation is
also confirmed in Table 3 (a) and (b).
Third, Figure 2 (c) shows that the foreign central bank employs the same size of FG policy
as the home central bank does. Interestingly, in contrast to the above two cases, it is obvious
that booms in both inflation and the output gap are created in both countries when home
and foreign central banks adopt the nine extra quarters FG policy. The impulse response is
symmetric in both countries. This result is associated with the assumption that the shock size
is common to both countries and γ = 0.5. Importantly, as shown in Table 3 (c), the minimum
worldwide welfare loss is attained when both home and foreign central banks follow an FG
policy fixed at six quarters. This might indicate the gain from policy coordination when the
ZLB is binding in both home and foreign countries.
Finally, Figure 2 (d) illustrates the impulse response to a global liquidity trap shock when
the foreign central bank implements the FG policy fixed at five quarters. We have shown
that home and foreign central banks that cooperatively implement the five-extra-quarters FG
policy can minimize the worldwide welfare loss derived from a global liquidity trap shock. In
this simulation we now assume that the foreign central bank adopts a five-extra-quarters FG
policy. It follows from Figure 2 (d) that the extended termination period of the home FG
policy causes the beggar-thy-neighbor effect on the foreign country. Thus, when the home
central bank considerably extends the implementation period of the FG policy, then it can
create booms in inflation and the output gap in the home country and also bring recession in
foreign country. This result is consistent with the cases for Figure 2 (a) and (b).
5.3 FG bargaining in a global liquidity trap
In this section we consider the international cooperation bargaining between home and foreign
central banks in terms of minimizing each central bank’s welfare loss. More precisely, we focus
on the condition of the gain from international policy coordination when both countries faces
the possibility of the ZLB. To do this, we calculate the time series properties of each central
bank’s welfare losses based on the results of the impulse response analysis.9
Figure 3 shows the time-series properties of each central bank’s welfare loss when a global
liquidity trap shock occurs in both countries. These calculations are based on the specifications
9In this simulation, we focus on the case for σ = 2.
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of each central bank’s loss function, namely (10) and (11). The sum of welfare losses of both
countries is calculated by the welfare criterion (9). In this figure the description in each panel
corresponds to that in Figure 2. The first row of the figure illustrates the global welfare loss,
which is a weighted sum of each central bank’s loss function. The second and third rows describe
the home and foreign welfare losses, respectively. It follows from this figure that while both
countries experience larger welfare losses when a global liquidity trap shock has occurred in the
first quarter, these losses converge in the second quarter. Also, this figure shows that a nine
extra quarters FG policy, which is described by the blue line, causes a persistent welfare losses
in both countries. We observe that in this case the persistent losses disappear in the eleventh
quarter. In particular, as shown in panels (b) and (c), when the global liquidity trap shock has
occurred in the first quarter, each central bank’s welfare loss under the nine extra quarters FG
policy is smaller than that under the five-extra-quarters FG policy. However, we note that if
the welfare loss in each country is assessed over the total number of quarters, the performance
of the nine-extra-quarters FG policy leads to poorer outcomes than the five-extra-quarters FG
policy. This result appears to be an important point for evaluating the effect of the FG policy
in a two-country NK model.
[Insert Figure 3 (a)-(d) around here]
As expressed in Table 3, we evaluate the effect of FG policies by calculating welfare losses.
The welfare losses calculated in this table represent the sum of welfare losses in all periods
in accordance with the cases (a) to (d) in Figure 3. The fourth and fifth columns represent
the home and foreign welfare losses, respectively. The third column again denotes the global
welfare loss, which is the weighted average of home and foreign welfare losses. In each panel,
we mark the minimized value with a star. In these four panels, the global welfare losses are
minimized when the six-extra-quarters FG policies are adopted by the home and foreign central
banks.
However, we note that the termination period of the FG policy is chosen not continuously,
but discretely. In addition, we cannot find the optimal length of the FG policy in all periods
we simulate because this might be a technical limitation associated with an EPFP methods in
an economy with occasionally binding constraints. In particular, we have difficulty in finding
the exact optimal FG length in the given range where the responses of home and foreign
inflation reverse from negative to positive. Therefore, as we cannot find the optimal FG solution
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that globally minimizes the worldwide welfare loss, we also acknowledge that our analysis is
constrained by the limitation that we cannot numerically and explicitly demonstrate the sub-
game Nash equilibrium under an international monetary policy game framework. Summing
up, with several technical limitations to our analysis, these results lead to policy implications
regarding the effect of forward guidance in a two-country NK model with the ZLB as follows.
In the cases (a), (b), and (d) in Table 3, when the home central bank adopts the FG policy
with six-extra-quarters, it reduces the welfare loss in its country. On the other hand, in these
three cases, since the foreign central bank cannot freely select the strength of the FG policy,
the extension of the home FG policy worsens the welfare loss in the foreign country. Table 3
also shows that when the home central bank conducts the FG policy that terminates the zero
interest rate after ten-extra-quarters, the home welfare loss again increases. Therefore, as long
as the home central bank seeks to minimize the welfare loss in its country, it would never adopt
the zero interest rate policy after ten-extra-quarters. We summarize the above discussion as
follows:
Remark 1 Regardless of whether or not the ZLB is faced in the foreign country, the home
FG policy causes the beggar-thy-neighbor effect on the foreign country if the home and foreign
countries are of the similar economic scale under a positive international risk sharing. This
result holds as long as the termination date of the foreign FG policy is shorter than that of the
home FG policy.
As shown in Table 3 (a), (b), and (d), the more extra quarters the FG is adopted for, the
smaller the welfare loss in both countries. This indicates that as long as both central banks
evaluate their welfare losses based on the measure of their own loss function, both central
banks would adopt the FG policy. Moreover, these tables show that the home central bank
achieves poorer outcomes when the number of FG quarters exceeds six in the home country,
and the foreign central bank also faces the same situation. As shown in Figure 2, extension of
the termination date of the FG policy creates a boom in both inflation and the output gap.
However, Figure 3 illustrates that since such an FG policy produces a persistent welfare loss,
it results in poorer outcomes in that neither central bank can enhance social welfare either
domestically or internationally. This becomes the source of the time inconsistency problem
of monetary policy. Thus, after the central bank declares an extension of the FG policy to
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combat the recession in its country, it has an incentive to renege on such a commitment. We
summarize this result as follows:
Remark 2 Under a positive international risk sharing, both home and foreign central banks
can improve social welfare by adopting FG policies as long as they assess the welfare loss based
on their own loss function. In addition, the home central bank minimizes its welfare loss when
it employs the FG policy for more quarters than the foreign country. However, in this case the
home central bank has an incentive to renege on such a commitment. Thus, there exists the
problem of time inconsistency associated with FG policies.
As shown in Table 3 (c), there is a gain from policy coordination if the home and the foreign
central bank cooperatively select the same number of quarters for their FG policies. Indeed,
both central banks attain their minimum welfare losses when they simultaneously adopt the
six extra quarters FG policies. On the other hand, Table 3(d) shows that when the foreign FG
policy is fixed at five quarters, the home welfare loss is 9.62 if the home central bank employs the
six-extra-quarters FG policy. This implies that the home central bank can obtain a gain of 0.31
if it extends the FG policy by one quarter once the foreign country has announced a five-extra-
quarters FG policy. However, the foreign central bank cannot achieve the minimum welfare
loss in this case. Furthermore, the worldwide welfare loss in this case is 20.83, and this value
is larger than the case where both central banks cooperatively fix the number of FG quarters
at five. Therefore, both central banks achieve their minimum welfare loss if they cooperatively
select FG policies of the same size. Nevertheless, each central bank has an incentive to escape
the international monetary policy cooperation. This result is summarized as follows:
Remark 3 Under a positive international risk sharing, home and foreign central banks achieve
their minimum welfare losses when they conduct FG policies cooperatively. However, they al-
ways have an incentive to renege on the framework of international monetary policy cooperation.
Finally, in this section we argue the case where σ is above unity. We note the case for
σ = 0.5. While the result of this case is reported in the online Appendix, the result shows
that the home FG policy now leads to the prosper-thy-neighbor effect on the foreign country.
We would easily conjecture that even in this case, both the home and the foreign central bank
jointly select FG policies of the same size.
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5.4 Discussion: Relevance to FG puzzle
Finally, we remark on the implication regarding the impact of the FG policy on the international
monetary transmission mechanism in a two-country NK model. Our model has shown that
the extension of the duration of the FG policy in each country affects output, inflation, and
nominal interest rates in the two countries through the international transmission mechanism
of monetary policy. However, the FG effect obtained in the paper might be stronger or weaker
than that obtained in a closed economy.
Several studies argued that the effect of FG is much stronger in the standard NK model
than the actual policy effects. For instance, Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2015) showed that
the effect of an FG policy unrealistically increases both inflation and the output gap when the
duration of FG exceeds a threshold value. Del Negro et al. (2012) labelled this inconsistency
as the forward guidance (FG) puzzle. In particular, McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2016)
pointed out that the extension of the duration of commitment of the central bank to the zero
interest rate renders this FG puzzle more severe.
While the effectiveness of the FG policy as one tool for non-conventional monetary policy is
theoretically supported in terms of the NK model, its power seems to be problematic. Several
recent studies focus on how the FG puzzle is ameliorated by extending the standard NK model.
To do this, Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2012) incorporated the perpetual-youth model
into the standard NK model. Also, Gabaix (2020) showed that the FG puzzle is resolved once
the bounded rationality takes the standard NK model into consideration. McKay et al. (2016)
attenuated the effect of FG policy by incorporating incomplete markets into the standard NK
model.
Moreover, Bodenstein, Hebden and Nunes (2012) and Haberis, Harrison andWaldron (2019)
showed that the power of an FG policy is weakened if the central bank’s commitment associated
with the FG policy is imperfectly credible.10 Campbell, Ferroni, Fisher and Melosi (2019)
showed the limitation of an FG policy, and argued that an imperfect communication strategy
of the central bank causes macroeconomic fluctuations. Nakata, Ogaki, Schmidt and Yoo
(2019) examined the effect of an FG policy in a model in which the forward-looking structural
equations, such as the new Keynesian Phillips curve and the dynamic IS curve, are discounting.
10Boneva, Harrison and Waldron (2018) showed that a threshold-based FG policy outperforms a calendar-
based one.
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Nakata et al. (2019) showed that in the case of the attenuated FG effect the central bank can
implement the optimal monetary policy by extending the ZIP for a while.
While these caveats are important, extending the current model to take into account the
above points is beyond the scope of this paper. While recognizing the limitations of comparing
the results with those obtained in the above papers, this paper addresses the importance of
considering the role of international spillovers of FG policies in a two-country NK framework.
6 Conclusions
This paper studied the effect of FG of monetary policy in a two-country NK model. While the
effectiveness of FG has been discussed in the closed-economy NK model, it is unclear how FG
affects the international transmission mechanism of monetary policy through a change in the
exchange rate. How does the effect of FG in one country lead to spillovers in other countries?
This possibility is not fully explained in the previous literature. This paper filled this theoretical
gap in the NK model. Also, after the turmoil of the financial crisis originated in the US in 2008,
it appears that the central banks in advanced countries adopted the zero interest rate policy
as one of the tools of unconventional monetary policy. Recently, the large shocks associated
with the COVID-19 pandemic force the central banks to again adopt the ZIP to recover the
economy from a severe recession. These facts motivated this study.
The findings of this paper are threefold as follows. First, the magnitude of the CRRA of
household consumption plays an important role in determining the beggar-thy-neighbor and
prosper-thy-neighbor effects in foreign economies. On the one hand, when households engage
in risk-averse behavior, home FG has a negative economic effect on a foreign country with
a symmetric economic structure. On the other hand, when households engage in risk-averse
behavior, it has the opposite economic effect. Second, if households are risk-averse and the
central bank’s objective is to minimize the welfare loss of individual countries, then both
countries would be better off adopting FG policies. Moreover, it is more likely that the home
country will adopt a policy of extending the duration of FG than the foreign country. Third,
there is a possibility of an FG bargaining situation in which the central banks of each country
cooperate to adopt the same FG extension period or, conversely, one of the central banks
deviates from policy coordination.
Finally, we would like to mention some extensions of this study as future works. As we
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mentioned earlier, we again note that we cannot explicitly derive the optimal length of the FG
policy under international policy coordination because our analysis is based on a numerical
exercise. As a future work, we would like to consider how the optimal FG policy is analytically
derived in a two-country framework. In addition, we show the possibility of the gain from policy
coordination through the case where home and foreign central banks jointly select the same
size of FG policy. This result is based on the assumption that home and foreign central banks
that follow a simple policy rule with FG jointly select the same size of FG policies. However,
strictly speaking, we need to check whether our results correspond to the optimal cooperative
policy, which implies that home and foreign central banks jointly minimize the worldwide loss
function.
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Table 1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value
α Calvo pricing for home country 0.9
α∗ Calvo pricing for foreign country 0.9
β Discount factor 0.985
σ Relative risk aversion coefficient 2.0
γ Degree of openness 0.5
η Inverse of Frish labor elasticity 1.5
θ Elasticity of substitution for individual goods 10.0
ψr Interest rate smoothing in the Taylor rule for Country H 0
ψπ Inflation stabilization in the Taylor rule for Country H 1.25
ψx Output gap stabilization in the Taylor rule for Country H 0.5
ψ∗r Interest rate smoothing in the Taylor rule for Country F 0
ψ∗π Inflation stabilization in the Taylor rule for Country F　　 1.25
ψ∗x Output gap stabilization in the Taylor rule for Country F 0.5
ρr AR(1) coefficient for natural interest rate shock in Country H 0.8
ρ∗r AR(1) coefficient for natural interest rate shock in Country F 0.8
eNRt Size of shock to natural rate of interest in Country H -0.05
eGLt Size of shock to global liquidity trap in Country H -0.04
(eGLt )
∗ Size of shock to global liquidity trap in Country F -0.04
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Table 2: Welfare losses in a natural rate shock of only Country H
(a) High degree of CRRA ( σ = 2 )
H policy F policy World loss H loss F loss
ZLB non ZLB 23.94 23.50 0.44
FG 2 extra qtrs non ZLB 22.03 21.64 0.39
FG 4 extra qtr non ZLB 17.30 16.97 0.33
FG 5 extra qtr non ZLB 14.77⋆ 14.46⋆ 0.31⋆
FG 9 extra qtr non ZLB 19.94 19.42 0.52
FG 10 extra qtr non ZLB 29.72 29.04 0.68
(b) Medium degree of CRRA ( σ = 1 )
H policy F policy World loss H loss F loss
ZLB non ZLB 26.95 26.95 0.00
FG 2 extra qtr non ZLB 25.30 25.30 0.00
FG 4 extra qtr non ZLB 19.26 19.26 0.00
FG 5 extra qtr non ZLB 15.84⋆ 15.84⋆ 0.00
FG 9Q Extra non ZLB 24.54 24.54 0.00
(c) Low degree of CRRA ( σ = 0.5 )
H policy F policy World loss H loss F loss
ZLB non ZLB 33.27 32.67 0.60
FG 2 extra qtr non ZLB 28.28 27.72 0.57
FG 4 extra qtr non ZLB 19.01 18.44 0.56⋆
FG 5 extra qtr non ZLB 15.65⋆ 15.06⋆ 0.59
FG 9 extra qtr non ZLB 55.31 54.18 1.13
Note：In Table 2, we compute the impulse responses for the case where only the home country experiences a negative shock of natural rate
of interest and the foreign country does not. The H policy column indicates the type of monetary policy taken by the home country;
similarly, the F policy column indicates the type of monetary policy taken by the foreign country; Non ZLB indicates monetary policy
without the ZLB constraint of the normal linear model; on the other hand, ZLB indicates the zero lower bound constraint. The welfare loss
values shown in the third and fifth columns are calculated from equations (9) through (11) described in Section 3.2. Specifically, the value
of the home country’s welfare loss is calculated from equation (10), while the foreign country’s loss is calculated from equation (11). In
addition, the loss of the world economy is calculated from equation (9).
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Table 3: Welfare losses under the home FG policy
(a) Country F without ZLB constraint
H policy F policy World loss H loss F loss
ZLB non ZLB 27.98 13.75 14.24⋆
FG 4 extra qtr non ZLB 26.22 11.40 14.82
FG 5 extra qtr non ZLB 25.17⋆ 10.17⋆ 15.00
FG 10 extra qtr non ZLB 36.44 21.67 14.76
(b) Country F with ZLB constraint
H policy F policy World loss H loss F loss
ZLB ZLB 27.20 13.60 13.60⋆
FG 2 extra qtr ZLB 26.94 13.19 13.75
FG 4 extra qtr ZLB 25.38 11.27 14.11
FG 5 extra qtr ZLB 24.33⋆ 10.06⋆ 14.27
FG 10 extra qtr ZLB 35.59 21.80 13.79
(c) Both central banks adopt the same length of FG
H policy F policy World loss H loss F loss
ZLB ZLB 27.20 13.60 13.60
FG 2 extra qtr FG 2 extra qtr 26.73 13.37 13.37
FG 4 extra qtr FG 4 extra qtr 23.82 11.91 11.91
FG 6 extra qtr FG 6 extra qtr 19.86⋆ 9.93⋆ 9.93⋆
FG 10 extra qtr FG 10 extra qtr 33.00 16.50 16.50
(d) Country F adopt fixed 5 extra quarters FG
H policy F policy World loss H loss F loss
ZLB FG 5 extra qtr 24.33 14.27 10.06⋆
FG 5 extra qtr FG 5 extra qtr 21.72 10.86 10.86
FG 6 extra qtr FG 5 extra qtr 20.83⋆ 9.62⋆ 11.20
FG 10 extra qtr FG 5 extra qtr 32.89 20.79 12.10
Note: In Table 3, we compute the impulse responses for the case where both the home country and the foreign country experience negative
shocks of natural rate of interest with the same magnitude at the same time. However, unlike in Table 2, the size of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is fixed at 2. The H policy column indicates the type of monetary policy taken by the home country. Similarly,
the F policy column indicates the type of monetary policy taken by the foreign country. The notation for each item is as in Table 2.
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Figure 1: The impulse response to a natural rate shock of only country H
(a) High degree of CRRA ( σ = 2 )
29
(b) Medium degree of CRRA ( σ = 1 )
30
(c) Low degree of CRRA ( σ = 0.5 )
Note: The impulse responses are calculated for the case where negative shocks of natural rate of interest occur only in the home country
and no shocks occur in the foreign country. Panels a, b, and c show the case where the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 2, 1, and
0.5, respectively. It should be noted that in all three cases, no zero lower bound constraint is imposed on the foreign monetary policy.
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Figure 2: The impulse response to a global liquidity trap shock
(a) Country F without the ZLB constraint
32
(b) Country F with the ZLB constraint
33
(c) Both central banks adopt the same length of FG
34
(d) Country F adopts fixed 5 extra quarters FG
Note: We compute the impulse response in the case where both home and foreign countries experience a negative shock of natural rate of
interest with the same magnitude at the same time. However, unlike in Figure 1, the size of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
fixed at 2. Panels a, b, c, and d show the case where the type of monetary policy taken by the foreign country is no zero lower bound
constraint, the case where the type of monetary policy taken by the foreign country is zero lower bound constraint, the case where the two
countries implement forward guidance policies for the same period, the case where a foreign country implements a forward guidance policy
extended by five quarters, respectively.
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Figure 3: The effect of FG on social welfare
(a) Country F without the ZLB constraint
(b) Country F with the ZLB constraint
36
(c) Both central banks adopt the same length of FG
(d) Country F adopt fixed 5 extra quarters FG
Note: We calculate the value of the welfare loss in the case where both the home country and the foreign country simultaneously
experience a negative shock of natural rate of interest with the same magnitude. This value is calculated from equations (9) through (11),
which are explained in Section 3.2. Panels a, b, c, and d show the case where the type of monetary policy taken by the foreign country is
no zero lower bound constraint, the case where the type of monetary policy taken by the foreign country is zero lower bound constraint,
the case where the two countries implement forward guidance policies for the same period, the case where a foreign country implements a
forward guidance policy extended by five quarters, respectively. Specifically, the world loss in the upper graph of each panel is calculated
from equation (9); the value of the home country’s welfare loss in the second graph is calculated from equation (10); and the foreign
country’s loss in the third graph is calculated from equation (11).
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Abstract
In this note, we provide a detailed derivation of a two-country New Keynesian
(NK) economy. We derive the structural model and the loss function of the central
bank in a two-country NK model. We then provide some additional results that
are not reported in the main text.
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A Model
In this note, we derive a two-country new Keynesian model between the two countries.
This model is based on the framework developed by Clarida et al. (2002). We consider
an economy with two symmetric large countries, a home country and a foreign country.
The sizes of the home and foreign economies are 1− γ and γ, respectively.
There are two production sectors in each country. The final goods sector, which is
characterized by perfect competition. The intermediate goods sector faces monopolistic
competition and Calvo (1983) type nominal price rigidities. We acknowledge that the
degree of price stickiness varies across countries. The number of final goods producers
is equal to the number of households in each country. We also assume that there is
a complete market in both countries and that only final goods are traded. The case
of producer currency prices is assumed, which implies complete pass-through of the
exchange rate.
Finally, unless otherwise noted, similar equations hold for foreign countries. Also,
note that foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk.
A.1 Households
A.1.1 Preferences






where CH,t is the consumption of domestic goods and CF,t is the consumption of foreign








where k ≡ (1 − γ)(1−γ)γγ, PH,t is the price of domestic goods and PF,t is the price of






A.1.2 Household’s optimization problem




















where Ct is consumption and Nt is the household’s labor supply. We assume that the
utility function, u(·), is strictly concave and continuously differentiable, and the disutility
of labor supply, V (·), is strictly convex and continuously differentiable. We assume that
the utility function of households is separable into consumption and real money balances.
The representative household maximizes the above utility function subject to the
following budget constraint:
PtCt +Mt + Et[Qt,t+1Bt+1] = Bt +Mt−1 +WtNt + Γt − Tt,
where Bt is nominal bonds held for one period, Mt denotes nominal money supply, and
Wt and Γt are the nominal wage and dividend, respectively, earned from domestic firm.
Also, Tt denotes the lump-sum tax.
We assume that a complete market is present in both countries, and introduce the





whereQt,t+1 denotes a stochastic discount factor and rt is the risk free short-term nominal
interest rate.




where Et is the nominal exchange rate and P
∗
t is the price level in the foreign country.





















where Zt =Mt/Pt denotes real money balances.












In the subsequent discussion, we assume a separable utility function between consump-
tion and real money balances.
A.2 International risk-sharing
Next, we consider a risk-sharing condition between countries. The Euler equation for

















As in Clarida et al. (2002), we assume that the first order conditions are symmetric across
countries and the power parity condition holds. Under the separable utility function
between consumption and real money balances, as shown in Clarida et al. (2002), we






A.3.1 Final goods firm
The final goods sector is perfectly competitive and producers use inputs that are pro-
duced in the intermediate goods sector. In particular, final goods are produced according













where Yt is aggregate output, Yt(i) is demand for intermediate goods produced by firm i,
and θ is the elasticity of substitution. Note that both variables are normalized by 1− γ.


















where PH,t(i) is the prices for intermediate goods produced by the firm i. Note that
these variables are also normalized by 1− γ.
A.3.2 The intermediate goods sector
The intermediate goods sector is characterized by monopolistic competition, and each
firm produces a differentiated intermediate good. Firm i’s production function is given
by
Yt(i) = AtNt(i), (A15)
where At denotes an aggregate productivity disturbance.
As in Clarida et al. (2002), the intermediate firm’s real marginal cost is given as
follows:













Eq. (A17) reveals that the home real marginal cost depends on the terms of trade in an
open economy compared to the closed economy model.
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that price rigidity is present in the intermediate
goods sector. The following explanation focuses on the home country. A fraction 1− α
of all firms adjusts their price while the remaining fraction of firms α do not.
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We now consider the intermediate firms that can adjust their price. When revising
their prices, these firms take into account uncertainty concerning when they will be able
to adjust prices next. In this case, the intermediate firm’s optimization problem for the







H,t − PH,t+jφt+j). (A18)
where P optH,t is the firm’s optimal price. The first order condition of this maximization







H,t − (1 + µ)PH,t+jφt+j) = 0. (A19)
where the variable µ = 1/(θ − 1) is the price mark-up. In particular, when α = 0, this
equation takes the following form:
P oH,t(i)
PH,t
= (1 + µ)φt. (A20)










We now describe the equilibrium conditions in an open economy. The equilibrium con-
ditions for the goods market are given as follows:
(1− γ)Yt = (1− γ)CH,t + γC
∗
H,t, (A22)
γY ∗t = (1− γ)CF,t + γC
∗
F,t. (A23)
Since we assume that the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is






Furthermore, under the assumptions that the consumption index follows a Cobb-Douglas
specification and that the purchasing power parity condition holds, current accounts in
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both countries always equalize because the ratio of home income to foreign income is
constant. As this implies that the trade balance is zero, the following conditions hold:



















Eq. (A27) indicates that holding domestic output constant, an increase in foreign output
leads to an appreciation of the home terms of trade.





According to Eq. (A28), holding home output constant, a rise in foreign output induces
an increase in home consumption. Home consumption increases less than a rise in home
output because complete risk-sharing leads to consumption smoothing of households.
Using the assumption of separable utility between consumption and real balances and












It follows from Eq. (A29) that the home real marginal cost depends not only on domestic
output, but also on foreign output. For instance, from Eq. (A27), the terms of trade
improve when foreign output increases. The improvement in the terms of trade leads to
a decline in the home real marginal cost. Consequently, the decline in home marginal
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cost induces a decrease in home inflation. This mechanism is referred to as the terms
of trade externality. On the other hand, an increase in foreign output pushes the home
real marginal cost up due to consumption risk-sharing between countries. As pointed
out in Clarida et al. (2002), whether which of two effects dominates movements in the
home real marginal cost depends on the value of the relative risk aversion coefficient for
consumption.
Equilibrium under flexible prices
First of all, H̄ represents the value of steady state, Hnt is the value of efficient level. Also,
we define ht = log(Ht/H̄) as the deviation of Ht from steady state. The log-linearization
of the efficient level of domestic output is given by
[σ + η − γ(σ − 1)]ynt + γ(σ − 1)y
n∗
t = (1 + η)at, (A30)
[σ + η − (1− γ)(σ − 1)]yn∗t + (1− γ)(σ − 1)y
n
t = (1 + η)a
∗
t , (A31)
where σ ≡ −uccC̄/uc and η ≡ −Vyyȳ/Vy. y
n
t denotes the efficient level of domestic output
and yn∗t represents the efficient level of foreign output.
Equilibrium under sticky prices: Log-linearilzation
The structural equations in a two-country model are summarized as follows. In this










• New Keynesian Phillips curve
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ1xt + κ2x
∗












• Dynamic Investment-Saving (IS) curve




















• Money demand function1






























(1− γ)(σ − 1),
ϑ =
γ(σ − 1)
σ − γ(σ − 1)
, ϑ∗ =
(1− γ)(σ − 1)
σ − (1− γ)(σ − 1)
,
σ0 = σ − γ(σ − 1), σ
∗
0 = σ − (1− γ)(σ − 1).
Finally, from the definition of the terms of trade, the nominal exchange rate evolves
as follows:
ϵt = ϵt−1 + st − st−1 + πt − π
∗
t , (A38)
where ϵt (= log Et) denotes the logarithm of the exchange rate.
B Central bank’s loss function
We now derive the second-order approximation of the household’s utility function weighted
by degree of openness. The derivation of the central bank’s loss function is implemented
in the case of policy coordination. The following derivation is based on Clarida et al.
(2002).
1The money demand function is redundant in this paper. As mentioned earlier, this is because the
household’s utility function is assumed to be separable between consumption and real money balances.
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The utility function of the planner is given by


















− V (N∗t )
]
, (A39)
In order to obtain a well-defined loss function, it is necessary to eliminate the distor-
tions caused by monopolistic competition and real money balances. The first distortion
is eliminated by an optimal subsidy rate that eliminates the price markup caused by
monopolistic competition in each country. At an efficient level,




t ;At) = 1,




t ;At) represents the real marginal cost under efficient output. The
fiscal authority chooses the optimal subsidy rate that restores natural output to an
efficient level at zero inflation. As mentioned earlier, such an optimal subsidy rate is
given by
(1− τ)µ = 1, (1− τ ∗)µ∗ = 1,
and, therefore, we obtain ucC̄ = VnN̄ .
The second distortion is a result of an opportunity cost of holding money. As shown
in Woodford (2003), this opportunity cost should be considerably small in steady state
to obtain a well-defined loss function of the central bank. In particular, Woodford (2003)
argues that real money balances are sufficiently close to being satiated in the optimal
steady state. To do so, we can eliminate the distortion produced by the opportunity cost
of money.2
Before deriving the loss function, we define some notations. First of all, H̄ represents
the value of steady state, Hnt is the value of efficient level. Also, we define ht = log(Ht/H̄)
as the deviation of Ht from the steady state. In addition to these notations, we introduce
the following equation:










2See Chapter 6 in Woodford (2003) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
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where t.i.p. represents the terms that are independent of monetary policy, and O(∥ξ∥3)














where v̄ is the velocity of money and Z̄ = M̄/P̄ .
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∗








Next, the second-order approximations of the second and third terms of the right side
of the utility function are given by:
V (Nt) = Vn(N̄)(̄N)
[
yt − at +
1
2


































Combining Eqs.(A41), (A42), and (A43) and using the definition of the natural rate




























In this derivation, we used the relationship ucC̄ = VnN̄ , which is held in the efficient
steady state. Also, following Woodford (2003), we assumed that the distortion derived
from money holding cost is eliminated in this derivation.






















2 + t.i.p.+O(∥ξ∥)3. (A46)
Substituting Eq. (A45) and Eq. (A46) into Eq. (A44), the central bank’s loss function










Here, the periodic loss function Lwt in Equation (A47) is given by


























































C Quantitative results under negative international
risk sharing
In this section, we report the results of a simulation of the impact of the home coun-
try’s monetary policy on foreign economies in the case of a global liquidity trap shock,
assuming that households in both countries are risk-lovers. Thus, both countries have
a negative international risk-sharing channel. Again, as in our main manuscript, we ex-
amine four cases; (a) the foreign country does not face a ZLB constraint, (b) the foreign
country faces a ZLB constraint, (c) the foreign country has an FG of the same length as
the home country’s FG, and (d) the foreign country has an FG of five extra quarters.
The relative risk aversion coefficient is set at 0.5, and the other parameters and the
size of the global shock are the same as in our main manuscript. Compared to the case in
our main manuscript where households in both countries are risk-averse, the first thing
to notice from Table A1 is that the decline in welfare in both countries is more significant
in all four cases. Second, as the size of the difference between the responses of ZLB and
FG policies can be shown in Figure A1 (a) to (d), the impact of the home country’s
monetary policy on the foreign country seems to be smaller in the risk-loving case than
in the risk-averse case.
Panel (a) of Table A1 shows that when the home country’s central bank adopts FG
policy instead of ZLB policy, it contributes to improving the foreign country’s welfare
in the form of prosper-thy-neighbor effect. In this case, if the home country’s central
bank implements a five-extra-quarters of FG policy, the foreign country’s loss (welfare)
is minimized (maximized). The other three cases shown in Panels (b), (c), and (d) are
similar to Panel (a), where the foreign country’s loss (welfare) is minimum (maximum)
if the home country’s central bank adopts a five-extra-quarters of FG policy.
Thus, even when households in both countries behave as risk-lover, both central banks
can improve their countries’ welfare by adopting FG policies when a global liquidity trap
occurs. Moreover, since both countries’ interests are aligned, the choice of monetary
policy will become monotonic. In this case, bargaining and betrayal of determining the
12
length of FG are not beneficial. The coordination of monetary policies is sustained in
both countries, unlike the conclusion of our main manuscript.
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Table A1: Welfare Losses by a Global Liquidity Trap Shock
(a) Country F without the ZLB constraint
H Policy F Policy World Losses H Loss F Loss
ZLB non ZLB 43.53 20.58 22.95
FG 2 extra qrts non ZLB 40.96 18.24 22.72
FG 4 extra qrts non ZLB 35.42 12.91 22.51
FG 5 extra qrts non ZLB 33.84 11.28 22.55
FG 6 extra qrts non ZLB 34.96 12.23 22.73
(b) Country F with the ZLB constraint
H Policy F Policy World Losses H Loss F Loss
ZLB ZLB 47.12 23.56 23.56
FG 2 extra qrts ZLB 44.08 20.89 23.20
FG 4 extra qrts ZLB 37.70 14.75 22.95
FG 5 extra qrts ZLB 35.62 12.57 23.05
FG 6 extra qrts ZLB 36.20 12.87 23.32
(c) Countries H and F adopt the Same Length of FG
H Policy F Policy World Losses H Loss F Loss
ZLB ZLB 47.12 23.56 23.56
FG 2 extra qrts FG 2 extra qrts 39.75 19.87 19.87
FG 4 extra qrts FG 4 extra qrts 25.11 12.56 12.56
FG 5 extra qrts FG 5 extra qrts 23.29 11.65 11.65
FG 6 extra qrts FG 6 extra qrts 32.05 16.03 16.03
(d) Country F takes fixed 6 extra qrts FG
H Policy F Policy World Losses H Loss F Loss
ZLB FG 5 extra qrts 35.62 23.05 12.57
FG 2 extra qrts FG 5 extra qrts 31.04 18.87 12.17
FG 4 extra qrts FG 5 extra qrts 23.84 12.17 11.67
FG 5 extra qrts FG 5 extra qrts 23.29 11.65 11.65
FG 6 extra qrts FG 5 extra qrts 26.30 14.63 11.67
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Figure A1: IRFs to the Global Liquidity Trap Shock under negative international risk
sharing
(a) Country F without the ZLB
(b) Country F with the ZLB
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(c) Country H and F adopt the same length of FG
(d) Country F takes fixed 6 extra qrts FG
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